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REQUIRED DISCLOSURE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MERRITT B. FOX *
I
INTRODUCTION
One of the most distinctive features of U.S. business law is the stringent re-
quirements of ongoing disclosure imposed on issuers of publicly traded securi-
ties.1  This scheme usually has been justified as necessary to protect investors
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1. The United Kingdom is a convenient benchmark for demonstrating that U.S. requirements are
more stringent than those in any other country because the SEC considers the United Kingdom’s dis-
closure requirements more similar to those of the United States than are any other country’s except
Canada’s.  See Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. IS-55, 32
S.E.C. Docket 707 (Feb. 28, 1985).  Nevertheless, a detailed comparison of U.S. and U.K. disclosure
requirements for companies that issue equity securities reveals that the United States requires signifi-
cantly more information.  Differences in the requirements include the amount of detail about the na-
ture of the issuer’s business; data concerning the results of the different lines of business in which the
issuer participates; discussion of trends that are identified by management and may affect the issuer’s
future liquidity, capital needs, or operating results; and information about management compensation
and share ownership.  See SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure
Requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 INT’L  L. & POL. 457, 459-68 (1987); see
also GEORGE BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA 20-21, 37
(1976); SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATION-
ALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS III-91-92 (1987) (hereinafter SEC INTERNATIONALI-
ZATION REPORT).  European countries, in general, put much less emphasis on full disclosure.  See Pe-
ter Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws—Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and
Grant), 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978).  Japan has a securities statute that closely paral-
lels the Securities and Exchange Act of the United States.  However, the staff responsible for promul-
gating and enforcing the implementing regulations is very small compared to that of the SEC; many
provisions of the statute are treated as inoperative; and the emphasis is on de facto screening of issuers
by regulatory authorities rather than full disclosure.  See Kunio Hamada & Keiji Matsumato, Securities
Transaction Law in General, in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN §§ 1.02[1], 1.02[4][b] (Kitagawa ed.,
1987); SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, supra, at III-127-30.
The United States, in addition to having a set of regulations and an administrative apparatus that
together solicit more information from issuers than do those of other countries, also has a liability sys-
tem that prods more information out of issuers.  The liability system in the United Kingdom, for ex-
ample, is not as far-reaching.  See SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, supra, at III-116.
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from making poor trading decisions as a result of being uninformed.  Little
scholarly attention, however, has been paid to the corporate governance effects
of such required disclosure.2  In analyzing these effects, this article concludes
that required disclosure can improve corporate governance in important ways.
Indeed, improving corporate governance, not investor protection, provides the
most persuasive justification for imposing on issuers the obligation to provide
ongoing disclosure.
Before delving further into this topic, it is important to define more pre-
cisely the terms “required disclosure” and “corporate governance.”  “Required
disclosure,” as used in this article, means any legal obligation that requires an
issuer’s management to provide, on a regular basis, information that it other-
wise might not be inclined to provide.3  In the United States, the primary source
of required disclosure is the periodic disclosure requirements imposed on pub-
licly traded companies  under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”).4  Other sources of required disclosure include the law of the
issuer’s state of incorporation, the rules of the stock exchange on which the is-
suer’s shares are listed, and the issuer’s articles of incorporation.5  The term
                                                          
2. One notable exception is Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Govern-
ance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
3. There are several reasons why an issuer’s management might not want to produce information
if it were under no legal obligation to do so.  Disclosure might be helpful to competitors, major suppli-
ers, or major customers.  Both positive and negative information can help a potential acquirer of the
issuer to better understand the issuer’s business, and hence decrease the risk the acquirer would incur
in a hostile tender offer.  See infra Part V.A.  Negative information can make management look bad
and increase the risk of ouster by a hostile takeover or proxy fight —a threat that, if postponed through
non-disclosure, might be eliminated by subsequent good news.  Negative information can also injure
the public reputations of managers and, with it, their sense of self-worth.  See infra Part VI.  If man-
agement thinks that a leveraged management buyout might be in its interests, positive information
would increase the share price and make the buyout more expensive.  Failures in the market for in-
formation, including “end game” problems and “market for lemons” problems, limit the usefulness of
reputation alone as a method of policing this problem and create the need for a legal obligation.  All of
these points are discussed in considerably more detail in Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclo-
sure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
4. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 5 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).  The reference here is to an is-
suer’s obligations under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to file Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K
and an annual proxy statement pursuant to Schedule 14A.  Required disclosure is different from the
one-time disclosure associated with the registered offering of new securities.
5. By defining required disclosure in this fashion, this article focuses specifically on how required
disclosure can impact corporate governance.  This issue is separate from the debate about whether the
source of the requirements ought to be a national or multinational authority, or whether an issuer
should be able to choose the disclosure requirements, if any, under which it operates through its deci-
sions of where to incorporate, where to list its stock, and which terms to include in its articles of incor-
poration.  Commentators who believe that disclosure ought to be mandated by national statute include
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (noting that the regulation of corporate disclosure
under the authority of state corporate law rather than federal securities law would, because of regula-
tory competition, result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure
and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank Easter-
brook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669,
684-85 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Fox, supra note 3.  Commentators who believe that issuer
choice, disciplined by market forces, is superior include Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable
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“corporate governance” refers to the myriad mechanisms that shape the struc-
ture of incentives, disincentives, and prohibitions under which an issuer’s man-
agement makes decisions.
This inquiry will be confined in two respects.  First, while disclosure can in-
fluence corporate governance in ways that impact a variety of interests—
including labor, environmental quality, and the local community in which the
issuer operates—the focus here will be exclusively on shareholder welfare.
Second, the concern here is with the corporate governance of established issu-
ers with shares actively trading in a public market and without a control share-
holder or shareholder group.
II
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS THE CENTRAL JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUIRED
DISCLOSURE
Required disclosure usually is justified as a way of providing investors buy-
ing and selling in the secondary market with protection comparable to what in-
vestors buying in the primary market receive through new issue registration
disclosure.  Contrary to popular belief, however, the main social benefit of re-
quired disclosure is its influence on corporate governance.6  Investor protection
is a worthy goal of securities legislation, but it is not a persuasive justification
for the affirmative regulation of issuer disclosure.7  Disclosure is not necessary
to protect investors against either unfair prices or risk.
First, consider unfair prices.  Under the efficient market hypothesis, secu-
rity prices are unbiased, regardless of the amount of publicly available informa-
tion about an issuer.8  In other words, share prices, on average, equal the actual
                                                          
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998);
Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study
of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 922-27 (1994); Roberta Romano, Empowering Inves-
tors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
6. The discussion in Part I is based on a portion of Merritt B. Fox , Rethinking Disclosure Liability
in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 903 (1997).
7. This point is discussed in considerably more detail elsewhere.  See Fox, supra note 5.
8. Empirical work showing unbiased reactions to announcements of corporate information sug-
gests that the market is also unbiased to absences of comment by issuers about certain matters.  This
work consists of a large body of financial economics literature that evaluates the market’s reaction to
affirmative public announcements about various kinds of important events affecting particular issuers.
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982).  The typical such
“event study” involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced at one time or another
the announcement of a particular kind of important event, such as a stock split.  The studies show that
the shares of the affected firms, as a group, experience statistically significant abnormal returns at the
time of the announcement and, starting almost immediately thereafter, normal returns for the duration
of the study, which is sometimes as long as several years.  Thus, while some issuers’ share prices go up
in the periods following the announcement—compared to the market as a whole—and others go down,
the average change is near zero.  This finding suggests that as information diffuses to a larger and
larger number of investors, the price, on average, does not change.  Thus, the initial price reaction is,
on average, the same as if this larger group of investors also knew the information as soon as it was
released.  The announcements of events tested in this fashion are similar to the types of information
contained in Exchange Act filings.
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value of the shares involved regardless of whether issuers are required to pro-
duce substantial or minimal disclosure.  Thus, greater disclosure is not neces-
sary to protect investors from purchasing shares at prices that are, on average,
unfair or higher than their actual values.9
Next, consider risk.  With less available information about an issuer, the
share price, while still unbiased, is less accurate; that is, the price is more likely
to be significantly above or below the share’s actual value.  If an investor has a
less-than-fully-diversified portfolio, greater share-price inaccuracy can make
her portfolio more risky.  High-quality disclosure, to some extent, would pro-
tect such an investor by reducing this risk.  However, the investor can protect
herself much more effectively and at less social cost by simply diversifying
more.10
Thus, if required disclosure has a useful function, it is its influence on cor-
porate governance.  The discussion in Part III suggests that required disclosure
plays an important role in this regard.
III
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE’S ROLE IN ASSISTING THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF
THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE
The most obvious illustration of the influence of required disclosure on cor-
porate governance relates to its ability to assist shareholders in effectively exer-
cising their voting franchise.  If shareholders are better informed when they
vote for an issuer’s directors, they are more likely to know whether their inter-
ests favor retention or ouster of the incumbents.  The same is true of particular
propositions subject to shareholder vote, such as amendment to the articles of
incorporation, merger, or ratification of a transaction in which management has
an interest.  Such assistance, of course, is the explicit purpose of one form of
required disclosure for U.S. issuers—the proxy rules under Section 14 of the
Exchange Act—but the rationale of more knowledgeable shareholder voting is
applicable to all forms of required disclosure.
A sophisticated observer might respond that this example ignores the reali-
ties of both the typical individual shareholder, who has only a tiny portion of
the total number of outstanding shares, and the large shareholder, typically a
wealthy individual or institution holding as much as a few percent of the is-
suer’s outstanding shares.  The sophisticated observer would argue that, in the
case of the typical individual shareholder, the idea that disclosure assists voting
rests on a mistakenly idealized view of shareholders as citizens, imbued with
                                                          
9. For an analysis of why the noise theory critique of the efficient market hypothesis still does not
create a strong fairness justification for mandatory disclosure, see Fox, supra note 5, at Part II.A.1.
10. In portfolio theory terms, issuer disclosure reduces firm-specific (“unsystematic”) risk.  Firm-
specific risk can be completely eliminated by sufficient diversification.  See Barbara Ann Banoff,
Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L.
REV. 135, 182 (1984).
FOX_FMT2.DOC 03/09/00  12:00 PM
Page 113: Summer 1999] REQUIRED DISCLOSURE 117
civic virtue, acting within a corporate democracy.  In reality, all that is usually
at stake in a corporate election is money.  The behavior of the typical individual
shareholder can be analyzed accordingly.  To such a shareholder, the informa-
tion made available by required disclosure is useless.  Learning this information
is not worth the effort, even if the information is placed in her physical posses-
sion for free.  Moreover, there is only a minuscule chance that her vote will af-
fect the outcome of the election, and in the unlikely event that it does, she re-
ceives only a tiny fraction of whatever gain her better informed vote brings
about.
As for the large shareholder, the sophisticated observer would argue that
required disclosure serves no important social function.  Such a shareholder can
make its own inquiries of the issuer’s management, ask a wide range of search-
ing questions, and make the appropriate negative inferences if it does not re-
ceive full answers.  The information sought would be what the large share-
holder believes is most useful at the time, rather than answers to a “one size fits
all” set of government-mandated questions that are infrequently changed.
The sophisticated observer would be correct about the typical individual
shareholder.  He would be wrong, however, about the large shareholder.  Some
of the very same factors that cause the typical individual shareholder to find the
information not worth learning actually help make required disclosure vital if
large shareholders are to play their most socially useful role.
The essential distinction between the typical individual shareholder and the
large shareholder is that the latter has a big enough stake that it would find it
worth learning the kind of information produced by required disclosure.  The
problem is that the large shareholder is insufficiently motivated to acquire the
information if it is not made freely available.  Ideally, the amount of informa-
tion that should be made available to each large shareholder would be the
amount that a single owner of the same enterprise would want from an agent
who is managing the enterprise.  In a world without required disclosure, how-
ever, no large shareholder would be motivated to incur individually the costs of
seeking out this amount of information.  Huge collective action problems stand
in the way.11  Each large shareholder’s expected return from seeking out infor-
                                                          
11. These collective-action problems are reviewed in Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-
examined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).  Professor Black correctly argues in his article that the prob-
lems described herein could be at least partly overcome by cooperative action among major institu-
tional shareholders, if it were not for certain legal rules that chill such cooperation.  That point,
however, does not invalidate the description of required disclosure as a useful antidote to these collec-
tive-action problems.  First, the existing legal regime continues to have such a chilling effect despite
some recent ameliorating reforms to the proxy rules.  Also, even if all rules with such a chilling effect
were eliminated, the transaction costs associated with arranging the production and distribution of a
public good, like information, would still make cooperation expensive and imperfect.  Finally, Profes-
sor Black imagines a class of shareholders who cooperate in the absence of these chilling rules—
institutions that hold a few percent of the shares of an issuer and can usefully cooperate in a small coa-
lition to affect corporate governance.  This class of shareholders is a subset of all the shareholders I
have labeled as “large.”  A shareholder is large if it is big enough such that when it is presented with
the information that required disclosure makes available for free, it finds the information at least
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mation is much less than that of the single owner dealing with a managing
agent.  Again, it is still far from certain that even the large shareholder’s vote
will affect the outcome of the election.  Even if it does, the large investor would
receive at most only a small percentage of any gain produced by the change in
outcome.  Substantial positive externalities exist when a large shareholder does
receive information because the shareholder likely will exercise its franchise in
a way that will enhance the interests of all shareholders.  When these externali-
ties are added up, it becomes cost-justified for each shareholder to receive the
same amount of information from management as the single owner would
want.12  Required disclosure can be seen, therefore, as a way of aggregating the
demands of each large shareholder for information to be provided both to itself
and to other large shareholders.
Two other considerations favor required disclosure over leaving it to each
large shareholder to seek information for itself.  First, because the same infor-
mation is useful to all large shareholders, there are substantial economies of
scale for the issuer to produce it all at once, rather than providing the informa-
tion to each shareholder individually in response to the shareholder’s particular
requests.  Second, in any country that prohibits trading on material, non-public
information received from an issuer, the large shareholder faces an additional
cost in making individual inquiries.  If the shareholder receives any material,
non-public information in response, it is prohibited from trading the issuer’s
shares until the information becomes public.  Required disclosure solves this
problem because the very method by which the information is provided makes
it public.
IV
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE’S ROLE IN ASSISTING SHAREHOLDERS TO ENFORCE
MANAGEMENT’S FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Required disclosure can also influence corporate governance by helping
shareholders enforce management’s fiduciary duties.  Absent required disclo-
sure, managers are not inclined to provide information that might suggest the
existence of a breach of a fiduciary duty.  Without that information, it is often
impossible for shareholders to know about the potential breach.
Two examples illustrate this point.  First, one focus of the Exchange Act’s
                                                          
worth the trouble of learning.  For many issuers in many situations, the votes of large shareholders can,
in the aggregate, change the outcome of an election, even though individually they are not big enough
to be in the subset on which Black focuses.
12. One qualification is in order.  A single owner, who can keep the information it receives from
the issuer confidential, might want certain information that shareholders of a publicly traded issuer
might not want because providing the information through required disclosure makes it public.  Pub-
licly provided information becomes available to the issuer’s competitors, major customers, and major
suppliers, thus potentially injuring the issuer.  Mandatory disclosure imposed by a national government
can be a solution to this problem, however, by putting all firms on an equal footing so that they would
gain as much from the disclosure of others as they are hurt by their own disclosure.
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periodic disclosure rules is on issuer transactions in which managers have an in-
terest.  Once the existence of a conflict-of-interest transaction is known, share-
holders can force management to satisfy its burden of establishing the validity
of the transaction.  To do this, management must show either that the taint of
conflict has been removed by appropriate procedures in the transaction’s
authorization or, alternatively, that the terms of the transaction are clearly fair
to the issuer.  Without shareholder knowledge of such a transaction, the burden
placed on management by corporate law is meaningless.  Second, another focus
of these disclosure rules is on segmented reporting, which requires a break-
down of issuer performance in each of its separate lines of business.  With
segmented reporting, it is much easier for a shareholder to detect a decision so
poor as to suggest a violation of management’s duty of care.  Aggregate figures,
which combine such a failure with the performances of ordinarily successful
operations, are far less revealing.
The primary method for enforcing management’s fiduciary duties is the
shareholder derivative action.  The derivative action is controversial, however,
because of its “strike suit” potential.  A strike suit is a non-meritorious action
brought to blackmail management into a settlement so that management can
avoid the costly process of continued litigation, particularly the costs of discov-
ery.  There is a tension in corporate law because it is often difficult to identify,
before discovery, which suits are meritorious and which are not.  Measures ex-
ist to reduce the derivative action’s strike-suit potential by allowing easier dis-
missal before discovery; however, such measures are rather blunt instruments
because they discourage both meritorious and non-meritorious suits.  Without
the current level of required disclosure in the United States, this tension would
be much greater and the instruments much blunter, a point generally missed in
the discussion of this controversy.  Without required disclosure, most suits—
even the ones against managers who did breach their duties—would inevitably
start out as “fishing expeditions.”  The amount of discovery needed for share-
holder’s actions to perform any deterrent function would be much greater than
is the case today and, if allowed, would greatly increase the number of deriva-
tive actions.  The United States would be faced with the unenviable choice of
foreclosing a larger number of meritorious suits or subjecting issuers to even
more strike suits.
One could argue that required disclosure is not significantly helpful in as-
sisting enforcement of fiduciary duties because management is unlikely to dis-
close information indicating the breach of such a duty, even if it is required to
do so.  Devices designed to ensure proper disclosure, including the required in-
volvement of independent accountants, exaggerate this concern.  To the extent
that there is some truth in it, however, a second, related aspect of required dis-
closure remedies the problem.  A breach of a required disclosure obligation, if
ultimately detected, gives shareholders a cause of action under the securities
laws that is often easier to pursue than the underlying corporate law claim.
Required disclosure thus creates an additional deterrent against managers who
FOX_FMT2.DOC 03/09/00  12:00 PM
120 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 3
breach their fiduciary duties in the first place.
V
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE’S INDIRECT IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The least recognized, but most important, influences of required disclosure
on corporate governance are indirect.  Required disclosure positively affects
four of the economy’s key mechanisms for controlling corporate management:
the market for corporate control, share price-based managerial compensation,
the cost of capital, and monitoring by external sources of finance.  Through its
effects on these mechanisms, required disclosure improves the selection of new
investment projects in the economy and the operation of its existing productive
capacity.13
A.  The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is a well-recognized device for limiting the
agency costs of management where ownership is separated from control, as is
the case with the typical publicly held corporation.  More information, and the
resulting increase in price accuracy, improves the control market’s effectiveness
in performing this role.  In deciding whether it should buy a target that it thinks
is mismanaged, an acquirer must assess what the target would be worth in its
hands.  This assessment is inherently risky, and acquirer management is likely
to be risk averse.  Greater disclosure, however, reduces the riskiness of this as-
sessment.  With greater disclosure, therefore, a smaller apparent deviation be-
tween incumbent management decisionmaking and what is needed to maximize
share value to induce a potential acquirer to act would exist.
Also, when share price is inaccurately high, a potential acquirer, even
though it is certain that it can manage the target better than incumbent man-
agement, may find the target not worth the price.  The increased accuracy in
share price resulting from greater disclosure reduces the chance that this will
happen.
Greater disclosure thus makes the hostile takeover threat more real.  In-
cumbent managers will be less tempted to implement negative net-present-
                                                          
13. The discussion in Part V is based on a portion of Fox, supra note 6.  See also Merritt B. Fox,
Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70
VA. L. REV. 1005, 1017-25 (1984); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate”
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 985, 1006 (1992).  For other perspectives on the efficiency-enhancing
features of securities disclosure, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclo-
sure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995) (arguing that while regulators chase the goal of enhancing price
accuracy, the laws enacted under this banner actually work to reduce the flow of information relevant
to accurate pricing of securities); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995) (arguing that the goal of disclosure should be focused on
and limited to helping investors uncover breaches of contractual or fiduciary obligations); Lynn A.
Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Secu-
rities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (disputing the premise that an efficient market is able to
monitor or structure the allocation of scarce resources in the economy).
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value projects to maintain or enlarge their empires or to operate existing proj-
ects in ways that sacrifice profits to satisfy their personal aims.  Those that nev-
ertheless do these things are more likely to be replaced.
B.  Share Price-Based Managerial Compensation
Greater disclosure can also reduce the agency cost of management by in-
creasing the use of share price-based managerial compensation.14  The problem
with share price-based compensation is risk.15  Because of the risk, managers
who are risk averse will not want all of their compensation to be based on the
firm’s share price.16  More accurate share prices, which result from greater dis-
closure, make such compensation less risky.  As a result, managers who are of-
fered a total compensation package with a given expected value will be willing
to take a larger portion of it in a stock price-based form.
C.  Capital Allocation
Required disclosure, with its resulting increase in share-price accuracy, can
also improve the selection of proposed new investment projects in the economy
by directly affecting the investment behavior of individual firms.  This effect is
obvious when the project under consideration would be financed with a stock
sale.  The important point for this inquiry, given its focus on ongoing periodic
disclosure, is that improved share-price accuracy can have a similar effect even
when the firm finances the project some other way.  On the supply side, share
price can affect the cost of a project by affecting the terms at which intermedi-
aries are willing to extend alternative forms of financing.17  On the demand side,
share price can affect management’s willingness to use funds to implement a
new project in a couple of ways.  It can affect management’s willingness to use
debt financing because of the prospect that the firm will subsequently counter-
                                                          
14. Share price-based compensation is an affirmative way to better align the interests of manage-
ment with those of shareholders.  See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—
It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.  A critical review of
the literature advocating greater share price-based compensation for management can be found in
Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section
16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2096-2106 (1994).
15. Job compensation is a large part of the typical manager’s annual income.  Therefore, a man-
ager cannot diversify away the risk associated with receiving part or all of such compensation in share
price-based form.
16. There is empirical evidence that a reduction in the riskiness of an issuer’s stock will increase
the proportion of stock-based compensation that a manager is willing to accept.  Randall Kroszner
compared the percentage of shares owned by officers and directors in a representative sample of ex-
change-listed U.S. firms in 1935 and in 1995, and found that the percentage increased from 13% to
22%.  See Randall Kroszner, Were the Good Old Days that Good?  Evolution of Managerial Stock
Ownership and Corporate Governance Since the Great Depression, Presentation at the University of
Michigan Department of Economics History Seminar (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).  He found that the relationship between ownership and performance is very similar in the
two periods and that the most promising explanation of the change is the reduction in stock price vol a-
tility between the first and second periods.
17. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF
A PURPOSE 123 (1979).
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balance any new debt with new equity financing to maintain its optimal
debt/equity ratio.18  More generally, because of concern with public percep-
tions, low share price can constrain the use of both external and internal
funds.19
Combining the supply and demand factors, if share price is inaccurately low,
management may decide not to pursue relatively promising proposed invest-
ment projects.  If it is inaccurately high, it may implement relatively unpromis-
ing proposed projects.  Required disclosure, through its enhancement of price
accuracy, limits this problem.
D.  Reducing the Disincentives for Using External Finance
Required disclosure can reduce a managerial bias toward choosing internal
over external finance.  As discussed below, use of external finance has a favor-
able impact on corporate governance, so a reduction in the bias for internal fi-
nance is socially beneficial.
In the United States, as in most countries, the sale of publicly issued securi-
ties requires a disclosure-based registration of the offering.  This process in-
volves disclosure of some information that managers would rather not produce,
which is why the disclosure must be mandatory.  By funding new projects with
internally generated funds, managers can avoid these requirements.  This op-
tion is a gain to them, but only if they do not need to disclose the same informa-
tion for some other reason.  Required disclosure could provide such an alterna-
tive reason.  The more such information must be disclosed pursuant to required
disclosure, the smaller the incentive to avoid outside finance based on a reluc-
tance to disclose information.
External finance favorably impacts corporate governance because it forces
managers to subject their real investment choices to the discipline and scrutiny
of the market.20  Such scrutiny can have a very beneficial effect.  Studies show
that the investment projects chosen by firms relying predominantly on internal
finance are considerably inferior to those chosen by other firms, an inefficiency
which significantly damages the economy’s growth and productivity.21
                                                          
18. Some financial theorists suggest that there is no optimal debt/equity ratio.  For the classic
statement of this view, see Franco Modilgiani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).  The more orthodox view today
is that there are factors weighing against both too little debt and too much.  Too little debt deprives a
firm of its tax-deductible interest payments.  Too much debt leads to increased agency costs because  it
causes an increased divergence between the interests of debt and equity.  It also increases the likeli-
hood of bankruptcy, which would involve real costs.  For an overview of these points and the responses
of the adherents of financial structure irrelevance, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 447-66 (5th ed. 1996).
19. See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 282-87 (1987).
20. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
650, 654 (1984); FOX, supra note 19, at 132-40.
21. See, e.g., GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY (1961); William J. Baumol et
al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345 (1970).
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The hostile takeover activity of the late 1980s can be viewed as a reaction to
this problem.  It was concentrated in industries in which firms had large free
cash flows.22  In such cases, the objective of the acquirer often was to undertake
a leveraged financial restructuring of the target to increase the payout of cash
flows to the market.  Alternatively, the goal was to “bust up” the target by
separating, into different corporations, operations producing high cash flows
from operations being inadvisably financed by these cash flows.23
The hostile takeover boom may have partially corrected the problem of
suboptimal projects funded by internal funds, but it entailed enormous transac-
tion costs.  With the subsequent spate of state anti-takeover statutes, hostile
takeovers may be less effective at playing this role today.  Required disclosure,
by increasing what firms disclose as a matter of course, reduces the amount of
additional disclosure needed when a firm publicly offers new securities.  By re-
ducing one of the disincentives for external finance, required disclosure can
help alleviate the problem of poor investment projects much less expensively
than hostile takeovers.
VI
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE’S ROLE IN RAISING MANAGERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Professor Louis Lowenstein has argued that required disclosure can im-
prove managerial performance simply by forcing managers to become more
aware of reality.24  Her argument is that required disclosure will favorably
change managerial behavior in ways above and beyond the effects discussed
above.  Lowenstein states that a CEO’s “capacity for denial is no less than
ours.”25
When managers have the legal obligation to disclose certain information,
they may have to gather and analyze information they would otherwise ignore.
The proposition that this consciousness raising will lead to an improvement in
shareholder welfare rests on two assumptions.  First, without required disclo-
sure, management will not gather and analyze all of the information that could,
in a cost-effective fashion, help it pursue its own objective function.  Second,
the managerial objective function is sufficiently congruent with the best inter-
ests of shareholders so that if management, because of required disclosure, de-
termines how to better pursue its objective function, the actions it will take will
                                                          
For a critical review of these and several other studies, along with an estimate of the magnitude of the
effects on the economy, see FOX, supra note 19, at 233-37.
22. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 325 (1986); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
“Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 898 (1988).
23. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FINANCE 831, 851-52 (1993).
24.  See Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1342.
25.  Id.  As examples of this kind of benefit, Lowenstein cites the testimony of officials from two
European firms that their companies enjoyed managerial improvements as a result of submitting to the
U.S. mandatory disclosure regime.  See id. at 1357.
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also improve shareholder welfare.  Both assumptions, though debatable, are
plausible.
Despite the outside forces on management, few people would insist that
management does not have at least some degree of slack.  In other words,
agency costs can be minimized, but not eliminated.  Within this zone of slack,
managerial behavior can be analyzed appropriately in accordance with the be-
havioral theory of the firm.26  Using this theory, it is easy to imagine that man-
agement might not gather and analyze certain kinds of negative information
even though knowing the information would help management maximize its
own objective function.27  Required disclosure, because of its “investor protec-
tion” emphasis on negative information, might help correct the problem.
For several reasons, management’s objective function and the best interests
of shareholders are reasonably congruent in relevant ways.  A corporate man-
ager, like anyone, can be expected to value compensation, perquisites, respect,
power, affection, a sense of rectitude, and job security.  The sources of these
valued items are the firm’s current and future cash flows, firm size, and firm
growth.  To maximize these sources, management must operate each of the
firm’s existing facilities to maximize the discounted present value of its cash
flow and must identify, in rank order, as many promising new projects as possi-
ble for implementation.  Both of these actions are ones that shareholders would
want managers to undertake.28
It is certainly plausible that required disclosure could enhance manage-
ment’s ability to perform the first action, and there is no reason to believe that
it would hinder its ability to perform the second.  By revealing problems in ex-
isting operations that would otherwise be unreported, required disclosure can
help management pursue its objective function—holding constant, for purposes
of this part of the analysis, outside forces on management—and help share-
holders at the same time.  Reinforcing all of this, the typical manager’s self es-
                                                          
26. See, e.g., RICHARD CYERT & JAMES MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1992);
JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
27. See id.  In these models of organizational behavior, a select subgroup of all the information
potentially available to a firm is processed and evokes reaction.  The selection and reaction is charac-
terized by stable decision rules that have satisfied management’s performance aspirations and will re-
main in effect until there is a failure to meet these aspirations.  See id.
It is reasonable to think that the blind spots resulting from these rules of information selection can
be shaped by, among other things, cognitive dissonance.  See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dick-
ens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308-09 (1982).  In
accordance with the behavioral theory of the firm, the consequence is that certain kinds of bad news
will be avoided until, if ever, the practice of avoiding it leads to serious trouble.
28.  The primary divergence between the managerial objective function and the best interests of
shareholders develops where management cannot identify a sufficient number of projects with positive
net present value to exhaust its current cash flow.  In such a situation, shareholders would want the
remaining cash flow paid out to them whereas management would want to retain it to fund additional
projects.  Managers of such a firm, as long as they can keep their jobs, gain from using these internally
generated funds to implement any project that has a positive expected return, even if the project’s ex-
pected return is well below what shareholders could earn on the money, that is, a negative net present
value.  See FOX, supra note 19, at 116-50.
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teem depends in part on her public image.  Required disclosure, therefore, will
make her try harder to avoid actions that will generate negative information.
VII
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Disclosure has costs as well as benefits.  Given existing differences in firm
governance structures among countries, there are likely to be important differ-
ences among issuers worldwide in the level of disclosure that will maximize the
returns—net of the costs of this disclosure—from their capital utilizing, produc-
tive activities.
The decisions of a publicly held firm are the product of both its internal de-
cisionmaking structure and the external environment that provides the inputs
to make this structure function—most importantly for this analysis, shareholder
votes and new capital.  The internal, decisionmaking structure arises out of a
combination of the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation and the issuer coun-
try’s traditional business customs and practices.29 The external environment is
determined by a number of factors including the degree of concentration of
share ownership, the nature of the holders of any concentrated blocks, the rules
and practices under which these holders use their voting power singly and in
cooperation with others, the extent to which the legal system and suppliers of
finance facilitate or hinder hostile takeovers, and the relative availability of fi-
nancing in different forms—equity versus debt—and from different sources—
private versus public markets.
Comparative corporate governance has become an important subject for le-
gal and financial scholars in recent years, and the resulting studies show signifi-
cant contrasts among countries in both internal decision structures and external
environments.30  These contrasts indicate differences in the extent to which re-
quired disclosure will be effective in helping to align managerial and share-
holder interests and in assuring the best choice of real investment projects.
That, in turn, implies that one country’s optimal level of disclosure may be
higher than another’s—optimal being defined as the level at which the required
disclosure’s marginal benefits equal its marginal costs.
To illustrate, a set of rough contrasts can be made between the United
States, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom on the one hand,
and Germany and Japan on the other.  The varying schemes in these countries
suggest significant differences in the value of disclosure.  In the United States,
                                                          
29.  Custom and practice include both the typical terms of the firm’s articles of incorporation and
how people typically behave within a given set of publicly and privately imposed legal constraints.
30. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?
Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994).  An extensive
review of the growing body of literature concerning this subject is found in Michael Bradley et al., The
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 49-76 (Summer 1999).
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voting power is less concentrated, and institutional investors are less inclined,
separately or together, to exercise their voting power to influence corporate
decisions.31  In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada,
debt/equity ratios are lower,32 and there is more use of publicly offered equity
as a source of financing,33 particularly by relatively new companies financing
major projects.  Hostile tender offers are more frequent, as are solicitations of
public shareholders in proxy fights.  In contrast, in Germany and Japan, institu-
tional investors play a larger role both in monitoring managerial behavior and
in supplying finance, mostly debt.34
This comparison suggests that the optimal level of disclosure for U.S. issu-
ers would be higher than for German and Japanese issuers.  Institutional inves-
tors in the United States perform less monitoring of how managers of U.S. is-
suers make both operating and project choice decisions.  They collect, analyze,
and act on less information—both public and non-public—concerning these
matters.  Thus, more of the work of aligning managerial and shareholder inter-
ests with respect to these decisions falls to the hostile takeover threat and share
price-based managerial compensation, both of which are assisted by greater
public disclosure.  Greater disclosure, and its enhancement of share-price accu-
racy, also aids good project choice in the United States because of the greater
reliance by U.S. start-up companies on the public equity markets.35  The choice
of required disclosure levels by these different countries conforms with this
rough illustration.  The United States and Canada require the most disclosure,
Germany and Japan the least, with the United Kingdom somewhere in be-
tween.36
                                                          
31. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 30, at 22, 169-70.
32. See, e.g., F.X. Browne, Corporate Finance: Stylized Facts and Tentative Explanations, 26
APPLIED ECON. 485, 488 (1994) (“[Non-financial] [f]irms  in securities-based financial systems (the
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada . . . ) have quite low debt/equity ratios compared to
those in the bank-based systems of Japan, Germany and France.”); see also Bradley et al., supra note
30.
33. See Browne, supra note 32, at 494 (stating that external funding is significantly greater in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada than in Japan and continental Europe); see also
Bradley et al., supra note 30, at 51, 64-65.
34. Japanese firms borrow $5.33 from banks for every dollar they raise in the capital markets;
German firms borrow $4.20, and American firms $0.85.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and
the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 85, 89 (1995).
35. Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson show that the availability of venture capital early in a firm’s
life is greatly facilitated by the prospect of a vibrant market for initial public offerings in the United
States for issuers that have shown a certain degree of success.  See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gil-
son, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN.
ECON. 243, 246-64 (1998).  This explains, according to them, why there is so much more venture capi-
tal available in the United States.
36. See supra note 1.
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VIII
CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that required disclosure can play an important
role in corporate governance.  It assists shareholders in effectively exercising
their voting franchise and enforcing management’s fiduciary duties.  It also af-
fects positively four of the economy’s key mechanisms for controlling corporate
management: the market for corporate control, share price-based managerial
compensation, the cost of capital, and monitoring by external sources of fi-
nance.  In so doing, it improves the selection of proposed new investment proj-
ects in the economy and the operation of existing facilities.  Finally, it may im-
prove managerial performance simply by forcing managers to become more
aware of reality.
All of this information can help identify the relationship between national
differences in firm governance structures and their mandatory disclosure re-
gimes.  Disclosure has costs as well as benefits.  Existing differences in firm
governance structures from one country to another would suggest that the effi-
cient level of required disclosure for firms of one country is not necessarily the
same as the efficient level for firms of another country.  In fact, countries whose
firm governance structures suggest that disclosure would be of less value—
Germany and Japan—have lower levels of mandatory disclosure than does the
United States.
What is less clear is the cause of this observed relationship between disclo-
sure and governance structures.  Did differences in the amount of required dis-
closure lead to different national firm governance structures, or are the disclo-
sure differences naturally efficient outgrowths of national governance
structures that differ for other reasons?  Would the introduction of U.S.-style
mandatory disclosure in Germany and Japan lead to changes in their firm gov-
ernance structures, and, if so, would the changes be desirable?  If it would not
lead to such changes, would it nevertheless improve, in a cost-effective way, the
functioning of their current governance structures?  This article is, at most, only
suggestive in helping to answer these important questions, which are worthy
topics of discussion and further research.
